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I. INTRODUCTION
"One day technology will be commonplace which renders cordless
telephone conversations much less easily overheard, and laws designed to
punish eavesdroppers far more capable of being punished."I
Last Fall the telecommunications industry introduced a new generation of
cordless telephones-the 900Mhz cordless telephone.2 Unlike its predecessors,
the 900Mhz cordless telephone has unique features that make it considerably
more difficult, sometimes even impossible, to intercept conversations on these
1United States v. Carr, 805 F. Supp. 1266, 1273 (E.D. N.C. 1992).
A cordless telephone consists of a handset and a base unit wired
to a landline and a household/business electrical current. A
communication is transmitted from the handset to the base unit
by AM or FM radio signals. From the base unit the communication
is transmitted over wire, the same as a regular telephone call. The
radio portions of these telephone calls can be intercepted with
relative ease using standard AM radios.
S. Rep. No. 541,99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,3563
[hereinafter S. Rep. No. 541].
2Telephone Interview with Sharon Curry, AT&T Sales Associate, Randall Park Mall
(Nov. 1,1994).
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telephones.3 Some of these telephones are equipped with scramblers, while
other telephones are constantly changing frequencies to ensure the privacy of
the user's conversation.4 These additional safety features have finally
prompted Congress to protect the cordless telephone user.
While it is now illegal to intentionally intercept cordless telephone
conversations, cordless telephone users have not always been protected. Prior
to October 25, 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (hereinafter Federal Wiretap Act)
did not protect cordless telephone users from private persons or law
enforcement agencies who intentionally intercepted their conversations. In
fact, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (hereinafter ECPA)
amended Title III of the of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (hereinafter Title III) to expressly exclude cordless telephone
transmissions from the definition of "wire" and "electronic" communications.
5
With the advent of new cordless technology and the ubiquitousness of the
cordless telephone, Congress amended the ECPA, by removing the cordless
telephone exclusion with the enactment of the Communications Assistance For
3Telephone Interview with Betty Hodges, AT&T Customer Service Representative
(Nov. 1, 1994).
4 The AT&T 900Mhz telephone, Model No. 9100, is equipped with Digital Voice
Privacy. This feature digitally encodes the user's voice signal (scrambling) so their phone
conversations can not be intercepted by other cordless phones, radios or scanners. Id.
In December 1994, VTech Communications announced the release of the Tropez
Regency, a 900Mhz digital cordless phone. Phones: VTech Releases First 900Mhz Digital
Spread Spectrum Cordless with Multiple Handset Capability, EDGE, Jan. 2,1995. The Tropez
Regency incorporates digital spread spectrum technology, thereby enabling the
transmit and receive frequencies relayed between the base and handset of the phone to
continually change. Id. In fact, the Regency uses a propriety digital algorithm which
causes the operating channel to change every few milliseconds. Id. The result of this
technology is that it becomes nearly impossible for an interceptor to lock onto the user's
conversation.
5 Section 2510 Definitions
As used in this chapter-
(1) "wire communication" means any aural transfer made in whole
or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of com-
munications by the aid of wire, cable or other like connection be-
tween the point of origin and the point of reception.... but such term
does not include the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication
that is transmitted between the cordless the telephone handset and the
base unit;
(12) "electronic communication" means any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature trans-
mitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo-
electric or photo optical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce, but does not include
(A) the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that
is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the
base unit.
(emphasis added).
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Law Enforcement Act (hereinafter "1994 Act" or "amendment").6 Nevertheless,
the possibility remains that courts will not protect every cordless telephone
communication. 7 The statute remains ambiguous, as Congress did not
expressly include cordless telephone communications in the definitions of
"wire" or "oral" communications, and reference to its legislative history will not
likely illuminate matters.8 In fact, the definitions of "wire" and "oral"
communications in the 1994 Act are virtually identical to the definitions found
in Title III of the 1968 Act. Under Title III, Federal and state courts held that
cordless telephone communications were neither "wire communications,"9 nor
"oral communications" in which the cordless telephone user exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy.10 Recently, however, some state courts have
interpreted similar statutes, which forbid the interception of wire and oral
communications, to apply to cordless telephone communications.1 1
No doubt, confusion abounds in this area of the law, and Congress'
unwillingness to expressly protect cordless telephone communications, and its
failure to define a cordless telephone communication as either a "wire," "oral,"
or "electronic" communication, merely compounds the confusion. This note
examines whether the enactment of the 1994 Act will effectively protect
cordless telephone users in a background of outdated definitions,
misconstrued interpretations and technological distinctions.
Part I of this note reviews the history of the Federal Wiretap Act. Part II
analyzes case law interpreting the Federal Wiretap Act and various state
wiretap acts. Part III attempts to determine what a cordless communication
is-wire, oral or electronic, and whether the new amendment will protect all
6pub. L. No. 103-414,108 Stat. 4279,4290 (1994). Section 202 of the 1994 Act amends
18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1) by striking ", but such term" and all the words after it, and (12) by
striking subparagraph (A). Id.
7 See infta note 12.
8See infra part 111, C.
9 See Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Supp. 584 (M.D. La. 1986); State v. Howard, 679
P.2d 197 (Kan. 1984); State v. DeLaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985); seealso State v. King,
873 S.W.2d 905,908 (Mo. 1994) (stating that the emerging view is that cordless telephone
transmissions were not wire communications even before the 1986 amendment); but see
United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973).
10 A telephone user's "oral communication" is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment or the Federal Wiretap Act unless the caller exhibits a reasonable
expectation of privacy. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. See also Tyler v.
Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990); State v. King, 873
S.W.2d 905 (Mo. 1994); People v. Fata, 529 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1988). After 1986, however,
federal courts held that cordless phone communications were not oral communications.
See infra notes 78 and 83 and accompanying text.
1lStatev. McVeigh, 620 A.2d 133 (Conn. 1993); Statev. Bidinost, 644 N.E.2d 318 (Ohio
1994).
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cordless telephone users. 12 Lastly, Part V determines whether there is a better
way of legislating in an area that is forever changing and developing.
II. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL WIRETAP AcT
In 1967 the Supreme Court of the United States decided the seminal case of
Katz v. United States.13 Katz was convicted of violating a federal statute that
prohibited the transmission of wagering information via telephone.14 The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) witnessed Katz placing calls from a bank
of three public telephone booths on numerous occasions. 15 Without
penetrating the inside of the telephone booths, FBI agents attached
microphones to two of the booths with tape.16 When Katz entered the booths,
the FBI agents activated the microphones.17 The microphones were connected
to a recorder, thereby enabling the agents to obtain a record of Katz's telephone
calls.18 The recordings disclosed that Katz was placing bets and obtaining
gambling information. 19 After hearing the evidence, the district court denied
Katz's motion to suppress and permitted the government to introduce the
evidence.2 0 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision,
holding that the government's surveillance activities had "violated the privacy
upon which... [Katz] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and
12Given the fact that Federal Wiretap Act serves a dual purpose of protecting an
individual's privacy right while assisting the State in reducing the incidence of crime,
see State v. Howard 679 P.2d 197,206 (Kan. 1984), is it likely that the courts will make a
distinction between conventional and new generation cordless phones in an effort to
fairly balance the individual's right with the State's interest? Prior to the 1994
amendment, at least one court made that distinction, suggesting that a user of new
generation cordless phone may have a justifiable reasonable expectation of privacy due
to the phones privacy features. See United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 180 (5th Cir.
1992). Furthermore, the legislative history of the 1994 amendment intimates that when
Congress was considering whether to extend the legal protection of the ECPA to cordless
phones, it decided only to extend that protection to the "newer generation of cordless
phones." H.R. Rep. No. 827, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 12 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N 3489,3492 [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 8271; see also infra part I, C.
13389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14/d. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 proscribes the interstate transmission by wire communication
of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers by a person
engaged in the business of betting or wagering.
15 Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130,131 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
16/d.
171d.
181d.
19 Katz, 369 F.2d at 131.
201d.
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thus constituted a[n illegal] 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment."21
The analysis of the Court was driven by two essential principles. The Court
first determined that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not places.22
Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment protects persons from unlawful
surveillance of their telephone conversations, regardless of where a phone call
is made-in an office, in a home, or "even in an area accessible to the public",
i.e., a telephone booth.23 In contrast, the Fourth Amendment does not protect
what a person "knowingly exposes" to the public.24
Second, the Court overruled prior precedents that limited Fourth
Amendment protection to search and seizures of tangible property. The Court
concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not require physical penetration.
Rather, it prohibits the interception and recording of oral statements even in
the absence of a "technical trespass."25 In summation, the Supreme Court stated
that
[o]nce this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply areas---against
unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of
the Amendment cannot tum upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion into any given enclosure.
26
21Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. The Court noted the following:
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from
which the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass
so that he was as visible after he entered it as he would have been
if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when
he entered the booth was not the intruding eye-it was the unin-
vited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he
made his calls from a place where he might be seen. No less than
an individual in a business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a
taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the
door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him a place a call
is surely entitled to assume that the words that he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.
Id. at 352.
22 d. at 351.
231d. The Court recognized, however that surveillance, even of the kind in Katz, may
be lawful and legitimate if a court order authorizing the use of electronic surveillance
is issued. Katz, 389 U.S. at 355.
24 d. at 351.
25 d. at 353.
26 d. at 355. The reasonable expectation standard later found in cases
interpreting Title M is clearly set forth in Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion. Justice Harlan limits protection to those cases in which 1) a
1996]
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In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Katz, and the tremendous
scientific and technological developments that made the use and misuse of
electronic surveillance possible, Congress sought to update the Federal
Communications Act of 1934.27 Accordingly, Congress passed Title III to better
secure the privacy of communication. Title III prohibited the willful
interception of "wire" and "oral" communications unless a court had previously
issued a warrant.28 Today, Title I, as amended, remains the primary law
guarding the privacy of personal communications in the United States.29
From 1968 to 1986, the protections of Title III, however, extended only to
those communications that could be recognized by the human ear.30 In an age
of computers, electronic mail, cellular and cordless telephones, Title III had
become hopelessly outdated.31 Plainly, the "primary" law had not kept pace
with the development of communications and computer technology.32 In 1986,
Congress moved to amend Title III by incorporating "electronic"
communications. 33 In its report, the Senate noted that "today we have large
scale electronic mail operations, computer-to-computer data transmissions,
cellular and cordless telephones ... ."34 In the end, however, Congress failed
to expand Title III to reach cordless telephones. In fact, Congress expressly
excluded cordless telephone conversations from the definitions of "wire" and
"electronic" communications from the ECPA.35 Congress refused to criminalize
the interception of cordless communications since some types of cordless
communications could be easily intercepted. 36
person exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy and 2) that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
27S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 70 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112, 2154 [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 1097].
2818 U.S.C. § 2511 (1968); see also S. Rep. No. 1097, supra note 26, at 58, reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2113.
29S. Rep. No. 541, supra note 1, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556.
30S. Rep. No. 1097, supra note 27, at 70, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CA.N. at 2154.
31S. Rep. No. 541, supra note 1, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3556.
321d. Consequently, persons in 1986 were faced with a privacy crisis similar to the
tone that had plagued the United States in late sixties.
33S. Rep. No. 541, supra note 1, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3555.
34/d.
35 See supra note 5.
36S. Rep. No. 541, supra note 1, at 12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3566; see also
State v. Smith, 438 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Wisc. 1989) (stating "[wihen a cordless telephone
transmitter is used [, w]eak signals are transmitted from the base unit and handset in
all directions and may be intercepted ... by anyone who is listening with a scanner,
compatible cordless telephone, or other radio receiver").
Indeed, the cordless phone user was without protection. Oddly, however,
Congress saw fit to protect other wireless communications, namely the cellular phone.
[Vol. 44:99
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Nevertheless, technology, particularly technology in the
telecommunications industry, did not come to an impasse after 1986. In fact, it
raced at an ever increasing pace, ultimately producing yet another privacy
crisis.37 The 1994 privacy crisis was further fueled by the fact that in 1994 more
than 55 percent of households in the United States had at least one cordless
telephone.38 Despite this figure, Congress had not yet amended the Federal
Wiretap Act, and federal and state courts continued to caution those who made
cordless telephone calls that they did so at "their peril."39
After considering the lack of protection for cordless telephone users, the 1991
Privacy and Technology Task Force found the following:
[Tihe cordless telephone, far from being a novelty item used only at
"poolside," has become ubiquitous. More and more communications
are being carried out by people [using cordless telephones] in private,
in their homes and offices, with an expectation that such calls are just
like any other telephone call.
40
Recognizing the omnipresence of the cordless telephone, and the public's belief
that a "telephone is a telephone,"41 Congress amended the ECPA to extend
privacy protections to cordless telephones on October 25, 1994.42
III. CASE LAW
A. Cases Interpreting Title III of the 1968 Act
Although the cordless telephone entered the marketplace shortly after
Congress passed Title III43 the issue of whether Title III protected cordless
See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(b)(ii). Congress treated the phones differently since the cellular
phone's technology was more complex, and therefore, more difficult to intercept. See
Sen. Rep. No. 541, supra note 1, at 9, 12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3563,3566.
37H.R. Rep. No. 827, supra note 12, at 12, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3492.
3 8Karen 0. Nielsen, PCS: The Next-Generation POTS, TELECOM STRATEGY LETTER,
October 1994 at 37. "Cordless telephone penetration has risen from 36% of telephone
households in 1991 to 55% in 1994." Id. With so many cordless phones in the United
States, it is highly likely that at least one cordless phone is being used during any one
phone conversation-and with no privacy.
39 People v. Fata, 529 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1988); see also State v. Bidinost, No. 62925, 1993
WL 215454, at *9 (Ohio App. 8th Dist. June 17,1993), rev'd, 644 N.E.2d 318 (Ohio 1994).
40H.R. Rep. No. 827, supra note 12, at 12, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3492.
41A Telephone is a Telephone, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 10,1990, at 12A.
42H.R. Rep. No. 827, supra note 12, at 30, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3510; see
also supra note 6.
43 See Timothy R. Rabel, The Electronic Communications and Privacy Act: Discriminatory
Treatment for Similar Technology, Cutting the Cord of Privacy, 23 J. MARSHALL L.REV. 661,
666 (1990) (citing In re American Telecommunications Corp. and Elec. Indus. Assoc., 91
F.C.C.2d 362, 363 (1982)).
19961
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telephone communications did not arise until 1984 in the case of State v.
Howard.44 While tuning his AM/FM radio, Howard's neighbor intercepted the
defendant's conversations.4 5 Suspicious of illegal activity, the neighbor
recorded Howard's subsequent conversations and informed the Kansas
Bureau of Investigation (KBI).46 After receiving the tapes from the informant,
the KBI asked Howard's neighbor to continue recording.47 Upon receiving the
additional tapes, the KBI obtained a warrant to search Howard's residence.48
Consequently the KBI confiscated certain narcotic drugs at the defendant's
home and charged Howard with possession of cocaine and conspiracy to sell
marijuana.49
In construing Title III, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that the statute
should not be interpreted literally, when doing so would lead to absurd
conclusions.50 The court avoided absurdity, in its opinion, by concluding that
the term "wire communication" did not apply to the radio portion of the
cordless telephone communication. The court added that this was the obvious
conclusion since anyone tuning in his or her favorite radio show could possibly
intercept a cordless telephone conversation.5 1 The court agreed that cordless
telephone conversations were "oral communications," but nevertheless, were
not protected unless the user had a reasonable expectation of
privacy.52According to the Kansas court Howard did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy because the manual accompanying the cordless
telephone informed readers how the phone operated.53
44679 P.2d 197 (Kan. 1984). As demonstrated by the following cases, the Federal
Wiretap Act empowers a person whose communications have been illegally intercepted
to commence a civil action against the violator. See Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Supp.
584 (M.D. La. 1986). The Act also serves to exclude any evidence that is illegally obtained
by an informant or a law enforcement official. See United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193
(9th Cir. 1973).
45679 P.2d at 198.
461d.
47 Id.
48 Howard, 679 P.2d at 198.
491d. at 198-199.
SOId. at 205.
5 lHoward, 679 P.2d at 206.
52 1d. See supra notes 21 and 26 and accompanying text.
53 1d. The court's holding, that a purchaser of a cordless phone cannot have a
reasonable expectation of privacy if a manufacture advises the purchaser that the nature
of a cordless phone lends itself to interception, suggests that purchasers actually read
the owner's manual. It is highly unlikely that one needs to read or will read instructions
before using a telephone, cordless or otherwise.
[Vol. 44:99
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When faced with a similar case in State v. DeLaurier,54 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court also refused to interpret the Federal Wiretap Act literally.55 The
court concluded that cordless telephone conversations were not "wire
communications," and that while they were "oral communications," the
cordless telephone user did not exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy.5 6
Unlike the court in Howard, the Rhode Island court went beyond the oral/wire
analysis. It also concluded that a ordinary AM radio could not possibly be an
interception "device" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).57
The first federal court to decide the extent of Title Ill's protection prior to the
ECPA was the Eighth Circuit in Tyler v. Berodt.58 The Tyler case involved a
cordless telephone interception by another cordless telephone.59 Relying
substantially on DeLaurier, Howard and a federal district court case involving
an automobile radio-telephone, the Tyler court held that a cordless telephone
conversation was protected under federal law only if it qualified as an "oral
54488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985).
55Id. at 693. The DeLaurier court noted the following:
It follows that if a mechanical application of a statutory definition
produces an absurd result or defeats legislative intent, this court
will look beyond mere semantics and give effect to the purpose of
the act. The effect of defining defendant's broadcasts as 'wire
communication' would produce two results, both of which we
find to be contrary to the intentions of Title m. The first would be that
law enforcement authorities would find it necessary to obtain a court
order to listen to the A.M. radio .... Second,... the failure to obtain
such an order could conceivably lead to liability for both civil and
criminal sanctions.
Id. at 694 (citations omitted).
561d. at 693.
57DeLaurier, 488 A.2d at 693. Pursuant to section 2510(4), "intercept" means "the aural
or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication
through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device." Id. Apparently the court
ignored 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5): "electronic, mechanical, or other device" means "any device
or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communication
.... (emphasis added).
58877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989).
59 d. at 706.
6OSee Edwards, 632 F. Supp. 584 (M.D. La. 1986). The Edwards court held that when
either end of the communication is conducted on a radio telephone, that communication
is an "oral communication." Id. at 588. The court concluded, however, that the
interception of the oral communication did not violate the Federal Wiretap Act since
there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy in a communication which was,
"broadcast by radio in all directions to be overheard by countless people who have
purchased and daily use receiving devices or who have another mobile radio telephone
tuned to the same frequency." Id. at 589.
1996]
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communication accompanied by justifiable expectations of privacy."61 Setting
forth no new rationale, the court stated that as a matter of federal law the
defendants did not have a justifiable expectation of privacy.62
The Tyler court also observed that two other issues may arise in this context.
The court intimated that, a caller who uses a landline telephone and speaks to
a person using a cordless telephone would remain protected under Title III.
Although the court did not expand on this observation, or offer any support
for its conclusion, the history of the Federal Wiretap Act provides adequate
support. As held in Katz, a person using a traditional telephone undoubtedly
has reasonable expectation of privacy.63 The caller's expectation then remains
reasonable even if she calls a cordless telephone user unless, of course, the caller
knows that the person is using a cordless telephone. That caller, therefore, may
bring a civil action under Title HI against any person who intentionally
intercepts the cordless communication.64 The court also suggested that a
manufacturer may be held civilly liable for failing to provide adequate
warnings.65
B. Cases Interpreting the ECPA
As demonstrated through Hall, DeLaurier, and Tyler, both federal and state
courts found that cordless telephone communications were neither "wire
communications," nor "oral communications" in which a caller exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy before the enactment of the ECPA.66 By
enacting the ECPA, Congress affirmed the decisions of these courts, and
clarified that the radio portion of cordless telephone communications were
neither "wire" nor "electronic" communications. 67 After Congress enacted the
61Tyler, 877 F.2d at 706.
621d. at 707.
63 See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
64 Tyler, 877 F.2d at 707, n.2. "We note that persons using a standard telephone to
speak to a cordless telephone user are generally thought to be protected, because such
a person has no reason to know his or her words are being broadcast form the cordless
phone user's base unit to a handset." Id. But see In re Askin, 47 F.3d 100 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, Askin v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 382 (1995) (holding that the Federal Wiretap
Act does not protect landline or cellular users when it is the radio portion of a cordless
telephone communication that is intercepted); accord McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236
(6th Cir. 1995).
651d.
66
"[Tlhe emerging view is that cordless telephone transmissions were not 'wire
communications' even before the 1986 amendment." Tyler, 877 F.2d at 706.
6 7
"That cordless telephone conversations are not 'wire communications' was made
clear by the 1986 amendment to Title 1H, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) which provided that such
term does not include the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is
transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit .... People v.
Fata, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 683, 685 (1988).
[Vol. 44:99
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ECPA, however, federal and state courts continued to examine whether the
cordless telephone communication was an "oral communication" protected by
federal and constitutional law.
In People v. Fata, the Rockland County Court determined that a cordless
telephone communication may be an "oral communication," but that its user
did not exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy.68 Adopting Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in United States v. Katz, the court stated that a reasonable
expectation of privacy only arises when the user has an actual subjective
expectation of privacy, which society deems reasonable. 69 Finding a cordless
telephone communication no different than an announcement over a
loudspeaker, the Fata court reasoned that the defendant's expectation could not
be reasonable given the extensive use of the cordless telephone and the
common understanding about how they operate.70 Judge Nelson stated that
"[t]hose who use cordless telephones do so at their peril."7 1 While "cordless
telephones are a common and convenient form of communication," [] "they are
hardly devices which can assure privacy."72
The Fata court's interpretation of "oral communication" strikingly resembles
those interpretations found in decisions prior to the ECPA. Just as the Hall,
DeLaurier, and Tyler courts had earlier concluded, the Fata court determined
that although a cordless communication may fit within the definition of an "oral
communication," the expectation of the cordless telephone user could not
possibly be reasonable.
Federal courts, in contrast, were unwilling to include cordless telephone
communications within the definition of "oral communication" under the
ECPA. In United States v. Carr,73 the defendant's neighbor witnessed some
peculiar behavior, which caused the neighbor to suspect drug dealing.74 After
the neighbor reported the illicit behavior, officers conducted warrantless
surveillance and intercepted the defendant's cordless conversations. 75 The Carr
court held that the cordless conversations were not "oral communications."76
681d. at 686. The Fata court used a Fourth Amendment analysis to determine whether
the defendant's "oral communication" was protected under the ECPA. Congress
intended the judiciary to interpret the reasonable expectation component of the "oral
communication" definition in accordance with principles enunciated in Katz. See S. Rep.
No. 1097, supra note 26, a t 89-90, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2178; seealso DeLaurier,
488 A.2d at 694.
69Fata, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
70Id.
71id.
721d.
73805 F. Supp. 1266 (E.D. N.C. 1992).
74 1d. at 1267 n.2.
75Id.
761d. at 1272.
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Consequently, the officers were permitted to intercept the cordless
conversations without obtaining a warrant.
The Carr court adopted the at-your-own-risk rationale applied in Fata, but
also thoroughly investigated the legislative history of the ECPA, holding that
"by definition" a cordless communication is not an "oral communication. 77 The
court explained that an "oral communication" is one carried by sound waves
(an "actual untransmitted voice communication"), rather than by radio
waves.78 As a result, the radio portion of the cordless communication was
deemed not an "oral communication." By adopting this definition of "oral
communication" the Carr court completely excluded cordless communications
from the ECPA, thereby precluding the need to determine whether the user had
a reasonable expectation of privacy.79
In United States v. Smith, the court further analyzed the Carr court's narrow
interpretation of the term "oral communication."80 The Smith court similarly
noted that the very definition of "oral communication" limits the definition to
"any oral communication uttered by a person."8 1 Using the Carr court's
rationale, the Smith court reasoned that it was not Smith's actual utterances that
his neighbor intercepted, but rather radio waves.82 The Smith decision also
made it unequivocally clear that the ECPA does not apply to cordless telephone
communications.8
Although the Smith court interpreted the definition of "oral communication"
in a highly restrictive manner, the court still considered whether Smith had a
reasonable expectation of privacy.84 The court's consideration, however, was
77 Carr, 805 F. Supp. at 1272.
78d.; see also S. Rep. No. 541, supra note 1, at 13, reprinted in 1986 US.C.CA.N. at
3567. Because the part of the cordless communication that is intercepted is carried by
radio waves, a cordless communication, by definition, is not an oral communication.
When a user speaks into the handset, the telephone reduces the sound waves into radio
waves. Subsequently, those radio waves are transmitted to the base unit. During this
transmission, a scanner, radio or another cordless telephone can intercept the radio
waves. Id. at 1266.
79/d.
80978 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1620 (1993).
811d. at 175.
82 Id.
831d. at 177. The legislative history of the ECPA clearly indicates that the term "oral
communications" does not include cordless telephone conversations. "Lacking this sort
of illuminating legislative history, cases dealing with the pre-1986 version of Title LU all
focused on the 'justified expectation of privacy' requirement found in the definition of
oral communication." Smith, 978 F.2d at 77.
84Id.
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not triggered by the ECPA, but rather by the Fourth Amendment.85 To establish
that the interceptions were a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the court
stated that the government must first have significantly intruded upon a
reasonable expectation of privacy in such a way that the act can be called a
search.86 Second, the defendant must show that the search was unreasonable.87
Precedent dictates that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
during a personal conversation. 88 Nonetheless, the Smith court stated that a
person can minimize this expectation to a point where it is no longer
reasonable.89 In effect, the court concluded that a caller waives his right to
privacy under the Fourth Amendment when he knowingly exposes the
communication to the public by using a technology that is so easily
intercepted. 90
Although the Smith court was unwilling to find a reasonable expectation of
privacy in that case, it intimated the possibility of protection under the right
circumstances. The court recognized that the earlier decisions of Hall,
DeLaurier, and Tyler were decided when cordless technology was "primitive."91
In each of those cases, and in the legislative history of the 1986 Act, the courts
and Congress refused to protect cordless telephone communications because
they were made on telephones so easily intercepted. Therefore, the court stated,
"it should be obvious that as technological advances make cordless
communications more private at some point such communication will be
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection."92
851d. "Now that Congress has made it clear that 'oral communication' does not
include cordless telephone conversations, our analysis must proceed differently.
Whether the user of a cordless telephone has a reasonable expectation of privacy is now
only relevant for Fourth Amendment purposes." Id. at 177.
86 Smith, 978 F.2d at 176.
87Id.
881d.; see also supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
8 9See United States v. Bums, 624 F.2d 95 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980)
(holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for a loud conversation in
a hotel room that could be heard in adjoining rooms).
901d.
91Judge Johnson stated that "[tioday's cordless phones are different from the models
at issue in Howard and DeLaurier." Smith, 978 F.2d at 179.
921d. at 180. The Smith court stated the following:
When faced with a motion to suppress intercepted cordless
communications, a trial court must do more than simply conclude
that a defendant had no expectation of privacy because he used a
cordless phone; instead, the trial court must be prepared to consider
the reasonableness of the privacy expectation in light of all the
particular circumstances and the particular phone at issue.
19961
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C. State Court Decisions Finding Protection for Cordless Telephone users
After the Smith decision, courts in states with statutes similar to the Federal
Wiretap Act or with statutes based on the federal act, interpreted their statutes
to include cordless telephone communications within the meaning of either a
"wire" or "oral communication." Indeed in both State v. McVeigh93 and State v.
Bidinost,94 the Supreme Courts of Connecticut and Ohio, respectively, ignored
previous state and federal court decisions, and held that a cordless
communication was a "wire communication." Those state courts based their
decisions on interpretations that had once been deemed as absurd by the
Howard and the DeLaurier courts. In fact, the Bidinost case more closely
resembled a 1973 Fifth Circuit decision which dealt with a radio telephone.95
In United States v. Hall, a Tucson housewife intercepted the defendant's radio
telephone conversations on her eight-band megacycle radio.96 After the
housewife reported the conversations to a public safety agency, the agency
conducted warrantless interceptions of the defendant's conversations. 97 The
Fifth Circuit held the search inadmissible since the agency had intercepted a
"wire communication." Relying on the legislative history of the 1968 Act, the
court reasoned that a "wire communication includes all communications
carried by a common carrier, in whole or in part, through our Nation's
communications network."98 Based upon this indicia of congressional intent,
the court concluded that when part of a communication is carried to or from a
landline telephone, the entire conversation is a wire communication, and a
search warrant is required. 99 The court itself realized that classifying a
conversation between a mobile and a landline telephone as a wire
communication produced an absurd result. Nevertheless, the court determined
that Congress's definition of a "wire communication" necessitated that
conclusion. 100
In a similar fashion, the Supreme Court of Ohio recently held that Ohio
Revised Code § 2933.52(A) (hereinafter Ohio Wiretap Act), which prohibits the
purposeful interception of wire or oral communications through the use of an
93620 A.2d 133 (Conn. 1993).
94644 N.E.2d 318 (Ohio 1994).
9 5See United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1973).
96 d. at 194. Some of those calls were transmitted to a land-line telephone, i.e., a
conventional wire telephone.
9 71d. at 195.
9 81d. at 197 (emphasis added); see also S. Rep. No. 1097, supra note 27, at 89, reprinted
in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2178.
9 9Hall, 488 F.2d at 196-197.
10OThe Hall court noted that since these conversations were intercepted by an ordinary
radio receiver and not by a phone tap, they should naturally be afforded no more
protection than those occurring between two radio transceivers. Id.
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interception device, applies to the interception of cordless telephone
communications. 101 The Bidinost case, inter alia, involved the interception of a
cordless telephone by a baby monitor. In that case, the Bidinosts had a cordless
telephone and their neighbors, the Crippens, owned a baby monitor.102 The
Crippens' baby monitor was unplugged by their children, and consequently,
the monitor served as a receiver, enabling the Crippens to intercept the
Bidinosts' cordless telephone communications.l13 Once the Crippens became
aware of the monitor's receiving capacity, the Crippens, suspicious that the
Bidinosts had sexually molested their children, called the county prosecutor to
inform her of their monitor's capacity.104 The prosecuting attorney instructed
the Crippens to record any subsequent conversations received over the
monitor. Following these orders, Maria Crippen recorded the Bidinosts'
cordless telephone communications.105
The Ohio Supreme Court held that these interceptions were unlawful under
the Ohio Wiretap Act on the grounds that the cordless telephone
communications were "oral" and "wire" communications. In determining that
the cordless telephone communication was a "wire communication,"106 the
Supreme Court of Ohio, with the exception of United States v. Hall, rationalized
in a way uniformly rejected by every state and federal court. The court
determined that since the incoming message travels through the telephone
lines to the cordless telephone base unit, cordless telephone communications
are made, in part, through the use of communication facilities aided by wires.
Therefore, the court concluded that a cordless telephone communication is a
wire communication.lOT
101See State v. Bidinost, 664 N.E.2d 318, 328 (Ohio 1994). Ohio Revised Code
Annotated § 2933.52 (Anderson 1993) provides in pertinent part the following: "(A) No
person purposely shall do any of the following: (1) Intercept, attempt to intercept or
procure any other person to intercept or attempt to intercept any wire or oral
communication."
10 2 Bidinost, 664 N.E.2d at 326.
103Id.
104 d.
105Id.
106 The Ohio Wiretap Act defines a "wire communication" as "any communication that
is made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of
communications by the aid of wires or similar methods of connecting the point of origin
of the communication and the pointof receptionof the communication." OHIOREV. CODE
ANN. § 2933.51(A) (Anderson 1993).
107Bidinost, 664 N.E.2d at 327-28. Unlike its predecessors in other jurisdictions,
including United States v. Hall and State v. McVeigh, who applied and interpreted
nearly identical statues, the Ohio court found that its state's wiretap statute was not
ambiguous. Id. at 328-29.
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In finding that the cordless telephone communication was an "oral
communication,"108 the Ohio court reasoned that 'human speech" is not limited
to face-to-face human speech, as the definition refers to "any human speech."109
The court dismissed the State's argument that Maria Crippen had heard and
recorded radio waves, stating that Maria Crippen had heard and recorded
people talking on a cordless telephone.110
Interestingly, the court distinguished the Ohio Wiretap Act from the Federal
Wiretap Act. The court determined that the Ohio statute does not require a
caller to exhibit a reasonable expectation of privacy. Given the fact that the Ohio
Court of Appeals for the Eighth District devoted its entire opinion to this
issue,111 this conclusion was not only completely unexpected, but seemingly
implausible. Afterall, the origin of the term "oral communication" lies in the
Supreme Court's holding in Katz (an oral communication is not protected
under the Fourth Amendment unless the caller exhibits a reasonable
expectation of privacy); therefore, the requisite reasonable expectation of
privacy would seem innately connected to any definition of an "oral
communication."112
Despite the court's awkward interpretation, the court reached the
appropriate conclusion. The court stated that "we seriously question the
proposition that people communicating on cordless telephones have no
legitimate expectation of privacy. Fundamental rights should not be sacrificed
on the altar of advancing technology."' 3
Unlike the Ohio court, the Connecticut court was unable to apply its state's
wiretap statute without referring to the statute's legislative history. In State v.
McVeigh, police officers intercepted the defendant's cordless telephone
communications using a Bearcat scanner.114 The court ruled that the
108 The Ohio Revised Code defines an "oral communication" as "any human speech
that is used to communicate by one person to another person." OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2933.51(B) (Anderson 1993).
109 Bidinost, 664 N.E.2d at 327.
110d The State may have wished that it argued this matter differently. On its face the
State's argument suggests that people can hear and record radio waves. This of course
is not a valid statement. A more effective argument is as follows: an oral communication
is one carried by sound waves, not radio waves. A baby monitor acting as a receiver
intercepts the radio portion of the cordless telephone, i.e., the transmission carried by
radio waves from the hand set to the base unit. The cordless telephone communication
carried by sound waves. The court's holding is also problematic. It ignores what is being
intercepted (radio waves), and focuses merely on what is heard once received and
reconstructed.
111See State v. Bidinost, No. 62925, 1993 WL 215454, at *8-10 (Ohio Ct. App. June 17,
1993).
112 See supra note 68.
113 State v. Bidinost, 644 N.E.2d 318,328-329 (Ohio 1994).
114 State v. McVeigh, 620 A.2d 133,135 (Conn. 1994).
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warrantless surveillance constituted illegal behavior under Connecticut's
Wiretap Act.115 In holding as it did, the Connecticut court focused on a small,
albeit significant portion of the statute's language: 'Wire communication
means any communication made in whole or in part [over the telephone
lines]." 116 Finding this language ambiguous, the court referred to the legislative
history of the statute. Upon review of the history, the court determined that the
focus of the statute is the complete protection of any communication that
travels in whole or in part through the telephone lines.117 Because cordless
telephone communications are carried in part by the telephone lines, the court
concluded that it was irrelevant that the officers intercepted the conversations
as they were broadcast over FM radio waves.118
III. DEFINING A CORDLESS TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION
Having examined the history of the Federal Wiretap Act and case law
interpreting the Act, it remains unclear what, in fact, a cordless communication
is under the Federal Wiretap Act. When Congress extended protection to
cellular phones in 1986 it noted in the legislative history of the ECPA that these
communications would now be defined as "wire communications." 119
Congress' failure to do so for cordless telephones has left many wondering
what exactly a cordless communication is-wire, oral, electronic or none of
the above. Before attempting to determine what kind of communication a
cordless telephone is, it is necessary to address the different stages of a cordless
telephone communication.
Caller Y makes a telephone call to caller X.120 The call is transmitted from
Y's handset to his base unit. The portion of the communication that travels from
the hand set to the base unit is carried by radio waves, and is therefore deemed
the radio portion of the cordless telephone communication. 121 From the base
unit the communication is transmitted over wires, as if caller X were calling
caller y.122 It is indisputable that this portion of the cordless telephone
communication is a "wire communication." 123 Unfortunately this settled aspect
does not assist us in our task, as this portion of the communication is never
intercepted by other cordless telephones, radios, baby monitors, and scanners.
1151d.
116CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-41a (West 1994) (emphasis added).
117McVeigh, 620 A.2d at 142-43.
118Id. at 14245.
119 See S. Rep. No. 541, supra note 1, at 12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3566.
120 For the purposes of this discussion, caller X is using a landline, i.e., traditional
telephone, and caller Y is using a cordless telephone.
121S. Rep. No. 541, supra note 1, at 12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3566.
1221d.
1231d.
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The debate that surrounds cordless telephone communication concerns the
radio portion.
A. Wire Communication
By adopting the judicial analyses of the Bidinost, McVeigh, and Hall courts,
one must inevitably conclude that radio portion of the cordless communication
is a "wire communication" under the Federal Wiretap Act. Like the Ohio and
Connecticut provisions, federal statute defines a "wire communication" as "any
aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of the facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire...."124 As noted in Bidinost,
a plain reading of this language encompasses cordless telephone
communications within the definition of a "wire communication" since the
cordless telephone communication is made "in part" through the use of
communication facilities aided by wires.125 The Hall court recognized that this
conclusion is further supported by the legislative history of Title II.126
On the other hand, in Howard, a case decided prior to the enactment of the
ECPA, the court limited its interpretation of the definition of "wire
communication" to include only the wire portion of the cordless
communication.127 Nevertheless, it becomes clear that these courts would have
decided that the radio portion of the cordless communication was a "wire
communication," if such a conclusion did not lead to absurd results, i.e.,
obtaining a warrant to listen to an AM/FM radio.1 28 As the Smith court so
correctly observed in 1992, in an age where it is increasingly more difficult to
intercept cordless telephone communications because of developing
technology, it is not likely that the same absurd results envisioned by those
courts will continue to arise.129
Nevertheless if the courts adopt an ad hoc approach, the certainty in this
prediction may inevitably disappear. For example, if the case involves an easily
intercepted conventional cordless telephone, like the telephones in Howard,
etc., where the potential for absurd results still exist, the court may find no
protection for a cordless telephone under the definition of a "wire
communication." The Florida Supreme Court has recently noted the problems
12418 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994).
125See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
126See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
127State v. Howard, 679 P.2d 197,204 (Kan. 1984).
128ld.
129 See supra notes 91 and 92 and accompanying text; see also Mozo v. State, 632 So.2d
623,634 (Fla. 1994) (stating "[w]ith the change in technology, cordless phones are now
nearly as secure as traditional phones .... "). But see State v. Bidinost, 644 N.E.2d 318(Ohio 1994).
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that may arise if courts decide to use technology as a gauge to decide cases. 130
Judge Anstead stated the following:
[fIn addition to cordless telephones becoming more secure, technology
has also provided easier means of intercepting traditional
telephones.... [W]e would be naive to believe the government does
not possess the technology to intercept most communications with
relative ease. Indeed, if an "ease of interception" standard were applied
there would be virtually no private communications, by wire-based
telephone or otherwise, that would be protected from the
government's use of advanced technology to intercept private
communications. It could even be argued that with this rough parity
in ability to intercept, traditional telephones should be treated like
cordless telephones, with no reasonable expectation of privacy, rather
than cordless telephones being treated more like traditional
telephones, with an expectation of privacy. For obvious reasons, this
concept was rejected in Katz. 131
This matter will be quickly resolved however, if courts refuse to distinguish
between old and new cordless telephones and apply the Federal Wiretap Act
to all cordless telephones.
B. Electronic Communication
If a cordless communication is a "wire communication" then by process of
elimination, it is not an "electronic communication."132 The 103rd Congress did
remove the cordless telephone exclusion from section 2510(12), but the said
section continues to exclude any "wire or oral communication."133 Oddly, if one
studies the language of this section, it becomes apparent that a cordless
telephone communication could neatly fit within the definition of "electronic
communication."
First, the Federal Wiretap Act defines an "electronic communication" as "any
transfer of signs, signals, data ... sounds or intelligence transmitted in whole
or in part by a wire, radio or photo optical system .... .134 One could reasonably
interpret "sounds" to include the human voice, and further find that this sound
is transmitted in part by a wire system and in part by a radio system.135
130Mozo, 632 So. 2d 623.
13 1Id. at 634-635.
132 An "electronic communication" does not include "(A) [a]ny wire or oral
communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994).
133 Id.
1341d. (emphasis added).
13 5At least one state legislature has expressly included a cordless communication
within the definition of "electronic communication." Alaska defines "electronic
communication" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio... or photo
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Second, although Congress has addressed cordless telephones and electronic
communications separately, and never as two of the same,136 Congress
reported in the legislative history of the ECPA that, in general, "a
communication is an electronic communication protected by the [Flederal
wiretap law if it is not carried by sound waves and cannot fairly be
characterized as containing the human voice."137 Since the intercepted portion
of a cordless telephone communication is carried by radio waves, courts may
determine that a cordless telephone communication is an electronic
communication.
C. Oral Communications
The definitions of "wire" and "electronic" communications had at one time
expressly excluded the radio portion of the cordless telephone communication.
In contrast, the definition of an "oral communication" has never included such
an exclusion. 138 Nevertheless, federal and state courts, with the exception of
Bidinost, have uniformly refused to protect cordless telephone communications
under this definition.139
The Federal Wiretap Act defines an "oral communication" as "any oral
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying
such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic
communication."140 As noted in Howard, DeLaurier, Fata and Tyler, a cordless
telephone communication may be an "oral communication" if the user has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.141 It is clear from the Supreme Court's
holding in Katz that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy while
conversing on a telephone. Does a person, however, reduce his expectation of
privacy to unreasonable levels when he speaks on a cordless telephone? In
answering this question, the Fata decision relies on the ease of interception
standard.142 Accordingly, because a cordless telephone communication could
be intercepted by nearly any receiving device when the New York court
decided Fata, the court ruled that the caller did not have a reasonable
optical system, including a cellular or cordless telephone communication.... ALASKA
STAT. § 42.20.300 (1994).
136 1n the legislative history of the 1994 Act, Congress set forth the purpose of the new
law, declaring that the ECPA protections were extended to cordless phones and certain
data communications. "In addition, the bill increases the protection for transactional
data on electronic communications services ...."
137 See S. Rep. No. 541, supra note 1, at 14, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3568.
138See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1984).
139 See supra part I.
14018 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1994).
141 See supra notes 51, 56,61, 68 and accompanying text.
142 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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expectation. 143 Cordless telephones today, however, are less likely to be
intercepted. 144 As the ease of interception decreases, an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy will justifiably increase to a level of reasonableness. 145
Therefore, if a court were to adopt the judicial analyses of those courts today,
it is very possible that a court would find that the Federal Wiretap Act protects
cordless telephone users under its definition of oral communication since its
user, presumably, would have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
That presumption may be rebuttable given the fact that all persons may not
use a newer cordless telephone. Once again the conventional/new generation
distinction arises. Will courts protect all cordless communications?
Unfortunately neither the 1994 Act, nor its legislative history, provide a clear
answer.
As earlier noted, the 1994 amendment merely removes the cordless
telephone exclusion. The language that expressly extends protection to
cordless phones is found in the legislative history of the 1994 Act. 146
Nonetheless, even if courts turn to the legislative history of the Federal Wiretap
Act, it may not find a clear congressional intent to protect all cordless phones.
First, although the legislative history of the 1994 Act states that the protection
of the ECPA is extended to cordless phones, it does not state that all cordless
phones are protected.1 47
Secondly, the legislative history of the 1994 Act further states that Congress
decided to extend ECPA protection after examining a wide array of
communications, media, including "the newer generation of cordless phones"
(phones not easily intercepted).148 If one reads this legislative history in
conjunction with the legislative history of the ECPA, which specifically states
that Congress did not extend Title III protection to cordless phones because
they are so easily intercepted, it appears that there is no protection for
conventional cordless telephones.
1431d.
144See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
145See supra notes 90 and 92 and accompanying text.
14 6See supra note 137.
14 7The word all seems to be necessary. In Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976), the
Supreme Court held that a federal agency within the state of Kentucky did not have to
pay state permit fees for operation in that state under the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(1969) provided, in pertinent part, the following:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legis-
lative, and judicial branches of the Federal government (1) havingjurisdiction over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity
resulting ... in the discharge of air pollutants, shall be subject to, and
comply with Federal, State, interstate and local requirements.
426 U.S. at 171-72. Consequently, Congress amended section 1857(0 to include all
requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1988).
14 8H.R. Rep. No. 827, supra note 12, at 12, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3492.
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Nevertheless, Congress' willingness to protect cordless phones appears to
have come only after those phones were equipped with anti-interception
devices. For this same reason, persons who use the newer generation of
cordless telephone will likely have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In fact,
the Smith court addressed the possibility of protecting cordless telephone
communications under the Fourth Amendment by applying this very
rationale.1 49 The Smith court, however, was unwilling to extend ECPA
protection to the cordless telephone communications since the legislative
history of the ECPA specifically states that a cord-less telephone
communication is not an oral communication.150
If courts rely on the Smith court's analysis and the legislative history of the
ECPA, then it is likely that courts will not interpret the definition of "oral
communication" to include cordless communications. If the analysis, however,
shifts from what is actually intercepted (radio waves) to what is ultimately
acquired (sound waves-recorded voice), then courts may include all cordless
communications within the definition of an oral communication. 151 Unless, of
course, courts perpetuate the technological distinction among old and new
telephones in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.
IV. LEGISLATION AND TECHNOLOGY
With all the uncertainty that surrounds the Federal Wiretap Act, it becomes
evident that there must be a more effective way to legislate in this area of the
law. State legislatures may provide the answers.
In Alaska 152 and New Jersey, the legislatures have expressly included a
cordless telephone communication into the definition of "electronic
communication" and "wire communication" respectively.153 In Minnesota, the
legislature chose not to include cordless communications in the definitions;
however, the legislature did provide, although unclearly, that the inadvertent
interceptions of cordless telephone communications are legal, but that "persons
acting under color of law" may not intercept cordless telephone
communications without a warrant.154
149See supra notes 89 and 90 and accompanying text.
15OSee S. Rep. No. 541, supra note 1, at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3567.
151State v. Bidinost, 644 N.E.2d 318,327 (Ohio 1994).
152See supra note 134.
153The New Jersey statute provides, in pertinent part, "wire communication includes
any electronic storage of such communication, and the radio portion of a cordless
telephone handset and the base unit .... NJ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-2 (West 1994).
154The Minnesota statute states as follows: 'It is not unlawful ... for a person not
acting under color of law to intercept the radio portion of a cordless telephone commun-
ication ... if the initial interception of the communication was obtained inadvertently."
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.02 (West 1995).
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Perhaps most clearly, Arkansas, California and Tennessee have not
attempted to place cordless telephone communications into any of their
statutes' preexisting definitions, but rather have defined those cordless
telephone communications separately and distinctly. For instance, the
Arkansas Code states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for a person to intercept... a
communication that utilize[s] the electromagnetic spectrum frequencies of
forty-six to forty-nine megahertz generally used by cordless telephone
technology and eight hundred forty to eight hundred eight megahertz
generally used by cellular telephone technology ..... , 155 However, even in a
statute as clear as this, the danger of the statute becoming outdated or obsolete
tomorrow still exists when the legislature uses such narrow language.156 As
previously noted, cordless telephone technology now uses 900Mhz.157 This
statute protects only communications that utilize the spectrum of frequencies
ranging from forty-six to forty-nine.
Consider then the California statute,
(a) Every person who, maliciously and without the consent of all
parties to the communication, intercepts, receives, or assists in
intercepting or receiving a communication transmitted between
cordless telephones... between any cordless telephone and landline
telephone or between a cordless telephone and a cellular telephone
shall be punished... ."158
In this statute, the legislature was careful not to use technical terms, and at the
same time clearly protected cordless telephone communications.
From any of these examples, which were written prior to the 1994 Act,
Congress could have clearly and expressly protected the cordless telephone
user. Instead it chose to muddle the answer by simply removing the ECPA
exclusion, leaving behind a statute with a history of interpretations that have
not protected the cordless telephone user.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cordless telephone technology continues to develop and to pervade homes
and businesses throughout the United States. Presently, however, that
technology is not homogeneous. Cordless telephone technology ranges from
the very primitive to the cutting edge. Congress has indeed removed the
cordless telephone exclusion from the Federal Wiretap Act, but a study of past
155ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120 (Michie 1995).
156 0ne commentator has stated: "Technology moves on. It may take the legislature
years to hammer out the definitive expressions of its wishes in an area, only to have a
new technological development render the statute meaningless, or at least not as
comprehensive as intended." Elinor Schroeder, On Beyond Drug Testing: Employer
Monitoring and the quest for the Perfect Worker, 36 U. KAN. L.REv. 869, 895 (1988).
15 7See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
158 CAL. PENAL CODE § 632.6 (West 1995).
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case law and convoluted legislative history reveals that all cordless telephone
users may not be protected. Had Congress adopted legislation found in states
such as California or Arkansas, the individual's right to privacy under the
Federal Wiretap Act might not be as vulnerable as it is today. Nevertheless, the
vagaries of Congress have left the answer to judicial interpretation, and so the
question remains, will the technology of the phone serve as a guide for courts
in determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy?
If courts do incorporate technology into their decision making process,
discrimination under the law will undoubtedly occur and protection fade.
Instead, courts should endeavor to safeguard the individual's right to privacy
by including all cordless telephone communications within the meaning of the
Federal Wiretap Act.
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